

	G.E. Moore	Christine Korsgaard
<b>Nature of "Good"</b>	Simple, unanalyzable property, apprehended by intuition. Like "yellow," it can't be defined in other terms (Open Question Argument).	Grounded in practical reason and rational agency. Rational agency is the only intrinsically good thing..
<b>Source of Value</b>	Intrinsic goodness is fundamental and primary. Instrumental goodness is derivative. The value of the whole is not determined by the additive value of the parts (i.e. organic unities).	Intrinsic goodness is still important, but its source is tied to the demands of practical reason. Instrumental goodness is much the same as Moore described, but Korsgaard claims he also conflated two further value categories: extrinsic value and final value.
<b>Role of Reason</b>	Reason plays a role in identifying and maximizing intrinsic good (Moore is a consequentialist), but not in <i>constituting</i> what is good. We do not (and cannot) analyze goodness; we intuit goodness.	Reason is central. It <i>constitutes</i> what is good by determining what we have reason to value. Pure rationality is the source of normativity.
<b>Emphasis</b>	Focus on <i>what</i> is good (the properties of things). Moore's is a metaphysics of value.	Focus on <i>why</i> things are good (their relation to rational agency and practical reason). Korsgaard is attempting to explain the basis for normativity and its connection to value.
<b>Examples of Intrinsic Goods</b>	Beauty, certain states of consciousness (though he's somewhat flexible and the focus is on the <i>kind</i> of goodness).	The Kantian notion that rationality is the "unconditioned condition" for all values.
<b>Examples of Instrumental Goods</b>	Money, medicine, tools.	Money, medicine, tools (but the emphasis is on their role in serving rational ends).
<b>Key Difference</b>	Goodness is a <i>property</i> of things.	Rational agency is the only intrinsic good.
<b>Analogy</b>	"Good" is like "yellow"—simple and indefinable.	Our rational agency is the source of all goodness; it is like seeking the unconditioned condition of the cause of the universe.
<b>Korsgaard's Categories: How they Relate</b>	Moore's framework primarily deals with <i>intrinsic vs. instrumental value</i> . His method involves <i>intuitions and indirect argument</i> . He does <i>not</i> distinguish between final and extrinsic goods. For Moore, if something is intrinsically good, it's good in itself; if it is not, then it is instrumental.	Korsgaard's categories offer a <i>finer-grained analysis</i> . She accepts the intrinsic/instrumental distinction from Moore, but claims that Moore conflated further kinds of value. Intrinsic value has typically been contrasted with instrumental value, but Korsgaard claims the better contrast is with extrinsic value. Instrumental value, she claims, is better contrasted with final value.

Category of Goodness	Definition	Korsgaard's Critique of Moore	Korsgaard's Example
<u>Intrinsic Goodness</u>	The value a thing possesses <i>in itself</i> , independent of its consequences or usefulness. It is good in and of itself. For the Kantian, this is rationality.	Moore focuses primarily on intrinsic goodness but cannot explain what goodness is due to his use of the intuitionist method. He treats goodness as a simple, unanalyzable property, neglecting the Kantian option entirely.	Rationality or Rational Choice Making
<u>Extrinsic Goodness</u>	Extrinsic goodness is a kind of relational goodness. The source of this value resides "outside" of or "between" the thing and something of value. For Korsgaard, when a rational agent rationally sets an end for themselves, but the conditions for that end are not fully satisfied, then that end is extrinsically good.	Moore incorrectly conflates things with extrinsic goodness as being merely instrumentally valuable. Korsgaard views the value conferred on something by a rational agent as not fitting into either the intrinsic category, nor the instrumental. A new category is required.	The example of the painting locked up. If it were available to be viewed, then the conditions of its goodness would be satisfied and it would be a final good. Until then, however, its conditions go unsatisfied and its value is neither intrinsic, instrumental, or final.
<u>Instrumental Good</u>	A thing valued <i>for the sake of something else</i> , as a means to achieving a good.	Moore and Korsgaard agree that some things are merely valuable due to their being mere means to an end. These kinds of goods are the least valuable.	Money, medicine, tools.
<u>Final Good</u> <u>(aka Ends, Objective Goods)</u>	A thing valued by rational beings <i>for its own sake</i> . This is an extrinsic good for which all the conditions of its value are met.  (Notice this is very different from intrinsic value.)	Moore could not admit of this kind of good as he did not want the goodness of something to be dependent upon our desiring it. Korsgaard claims that while that is true of things that are intrinsically good, it is not true of goods that we set as ends for ourselves. Such goods, when their conditions are fully satisfied, are valuable for their own sakes by rational agents.	A mink coat, gorgeously enameled frying pans, etc.